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ABSTRACT
Determining  the  efficacy  of  available  counter-trafficking  strategies  is  just  as
important as understanding the phenomenon of human trafficking itself. This is
so  if  anti-trafficking  practitioners  wish  to  make  in-roads  in  preventing  and
combating human trafficking in South Africa. At the heart of the matter are the
ways in which counter-trafficking governance is structured in the South African
context. In this article we use the KwaZulu-Natal intersectoral task team, an un-
resourced  agency  of  provincial  government  mandated  to  prevent  and  combat
human  trafficking,  as  a  case  study  to  analyse  the  ‘4P  model’  of  counter-
trafficking  favoured  in  South  Africa.  We  find  that  while  such  an  integrated
model has great potential, issues of institutional cooperation and coordination,
pervasive  public  official  corruption  and  budgetary  constraints  hamper  its
current impact and efficacy. We conclude that these issues must be addressed
by South African policy-makers once legislation has been promulgated.
Introduction
Human  trafficking  represents,  for  many,  the  dark  side  of  globalisation  –  an
unconventional threat to the territorial and moral authority of the state and one of the
most salient social  problems of the twenty-first century. Human trafficking is a
complex  and  politicised  problem  that  is  used  to  denote  a  continuum  of
exploitative experiences and has elicited a range of responses from both state and
non-state actors. Despite consistent international attention and research over the past
decade,  human trafficking remains an amorphous  phenomenon – often conflated
with other intersecting issues, such as prostitution, (undocumented) migration and
transnational organised crime.
Counter-trafficking strategies remain largely untested. Measuring the success of
interventions  remains  woefully  low  based  on  the  number  trafficking  victims
extricated  from  trafficking  situations  annually.  As  more  states  grapple  with  the
complexities  of  human trafficking,  the  need  for  effective  and  efficient  counter-
trafficking  governance  structures  is  apparent.  South  Africa  faces  a  similar
quandary in the absence of operational anti-trafficking legislation1 and a national
policy  framework,  which  is  only  expected  to  come  into  force  in  July  2015.
Counter-trafficking in the interim is devolved to un-resourced provincial task
teams.  The  first  human  trafficking  task  team formed  for  this  purpose  was  the
KwaZulu-Natal  human trafficking,  prostitution,  pornography and brothels  task
team (KZN task  team) which was established in October 2008. Lauded by South
African anti-trafficking practitioners as one of the most successful task teams in
the  country,  its  ‘4P  model’,  based  on  prevention,  protection,  prosecution  and
partnerships, has been widely emulated. Using the KwaZulu-Natal intersectoral task
team as  a  case  study we  analyse  the  efficacy  of  this  counter-trafficking  model
within the context of current counter-trafficking governance in South Africa.
Methodology
We employ an  interpretive/phenomenological  approach to  social  science and a
corresponding  qualitative  methodology.  Semi-structured  interviews  and
participant  observation was employed for this  study.  Fifty-five interviews were
conducted  with  counter-trafficking role players  across South Africa.  In addition,
access  was  granted  for  observations  of  the  KwaZulu-Natal  task  team.  All
interviewees were offered confidentiality as a condition of  the  interviews.  The
data  generated  was  applied  to  the  case  study  to  analyse  the  efficacy  of  its
counter-trafficking  model.  While  parallels  and  variations  may  be  observed
across  provincial  task  teams,  our  focus  is  the  KwaZulu-Natal  task  team.  This
article  represents  one  of  the  first  efforts  to  analyse  the  counter-trafficking
governance model employed in South Africa at a provincial level.
Counter-trafficking governance in South Africa
The  sheer  complexity  and  pervasiveness  of  human  trafficking  means  that
governments  are  ill-equipped  to  deal  with  the  phenomenon  on  their  own.
Entrenched centralised,  hierarchical  patterns  of power and decision-making,  the
hallmark  of  traditional  bureaucracies,  renders  them  largely  ineffectual  in
addressing unconventional threats. Indeed, human trafficking as a complex social
problem necessitates a  governance approach.  Governance  refers  to  the  way in
which  state  and non-state  actors  form structured  networks  of  cooperation and
coordination across multiple levels to address shared problems. Similarly,  counter-
trafficking  governance  reflects  new forms of  flexible,  networked  cooperation  and
coordination  at  multiple  levels  involving  a  multiplicity  of  actors. 2 However,
such  an  approach  is  not  without  criticism  –  especially  with  regards  to  the
implementation of counter-trafficking policies and strategies. Indeed, the current
counter-trafficking system is viewed by Friesendorf (2009) as being deficient in
terms  of  effectiveness,  efficiency  and  legitimacy  which  invariably  effects
networking  and  policy  evaluation.  South  Africa’s  nascent  counter-trafficking
system faces many of these deficiencies:
Counter-trafficking efforts  operate  in  a  partial  knowledge void.  There  is  a
dearth  of  information  on  the  scope,  most  prevalent  types,  loci,  and  modi
operandi  of  trafficking.  This  is  due  to  the  covert  and  often  transnational
nature of trafficking, the social stigma attached to trafficking,  the lack of a
definition  that  lends  itself  to  operationalisation,  incoherent  data  collection
efforts, and other obstacles. (Friesendorf 2009, 496)
understudied and largely unaddressed. Chuang (2006, 137) contends that this is due to
the entrenchment of a three-pronged legal framework3 adopted by governments
which  focuses  ‘on  prosecuting  traffickers,  protecting  trafficked  persons,  and
preventing  trafficking’.  The  international  legal  framework,  in  the  form  of  the
trafficking protocol,4 entrenches a law enforcement approach that is geared toward
prosecution and disruption of trafficking operations instead of protecting victims,
and remains largely aspirational in terms of obligations derived from the trafficking
protocol (Gallagher 2010). There is a disconnect between rhetoric and practice at
the international level, and in the domestic context where anti-trafficking efforts
have  lagged  behind.  Owing  to  a  lack  of  domestic  research,  anti-trafficking
practitioners base their strategies on internationally accepted practice rather than
empirical  research.  Policies  are  thus  based  on  incomplete  knowledge  of  the
phenomenon, which may not consider regional differences or growing evidence of
the  interaction  between  human  trafficking  and  smuggling  (see  Shinkle 2007).
Such actions  make unintended consequences possible.  The danger – of a lack of
research on the consequences and impact of counter-trafficking strategies – is that
mistakes of past initiatives may be repeated (Friesendorf 2009), and at worst could
drive the phenomenon further  underground.  Moreover,  the  lack  of  operational
anti-trafficking legislation and, as a  result, a cohesive human trafficking policy
framework  means  that  issues  of  coordination  and  cooperation  are  more
pronounced  in  the  South  African  context.  Nonetheless,  func tional  counter-
trafficking systems are needed to effectively prevent and combat trafficking.
Counter-trafficking governance in South Africa lacks formalised structure due
in part to  its present lack of operational anti-trafficking legislation and policy. It is
fraught  with  operational  and  institutional  challenges  resulting  in  a  lack  of
coordination  (and leadership)  from the  national  level  which  relies  heavily  on
un-resourced provincial responses to  prevent and combat trafficking. At the time
of  writing,  human  trafficking  is  only  partially  criminalised.  Trafficking  for  the
purposes of sexual exploitation (where consent by the victim is absent) and child
trafficking are the only two forms of human trafficking that have been addressed
by  legislation,  albeit  in  a  piecemeal  fashion.5 This  has  led  to  operational  and
structural  issues  in  attempts  to  formally  address  human  trafficking  –  not  to
mention a lack of funding for law enforcement and government departments
that come into direct contact with victims and trafficking operations.
Although the Prevention and Combating Trafficking in Persons Act was enacted in
2013, it has taken two years for the national policy framework to be developed. In
the interim, the South African Police (SAPS), the National Prosecuting Authority
(NPA),  the  Departments  of  Home Affairs  and  Social  Development  have  drafted
national instructions, directives and regulations that are to come into effect once
the Act is operationalised to ensure that  these departments fulfil their obligations
and are  held accountable  (Part.  Obs.,  Durban,  2012/2013).  This  should facilitate
formalised  coordination  within  and  between  agencies,  especially  those  at  a
provincial  level  who  comprise  provincial  task  teams  mandated  by  the
Tsireledzani  programme,  headed  by  the  Sexual  Offences  and  Community
Affairs (SOCA) Unit of the NPA, to prevent and combat human trafficking.
Provincial  task  teams  form  the  backbone  of  the  South  African  counter-
trafficking system. However, they lack a legislated and permanent mandate. Indeed,
the  Act  only  provides  for  the  consolidation  and  formalisation  of  integrated
coordination and cooperation at the national level. It remains to be seen how this
oversight will be addressed when the
national  policy  framework  is  developed.6 The  failure  of  the  Act  to  formally
acknowledge  the  devolution  of  operations  and  coordination  to  the  provincial
level  could  result  in  inadequate  budgets  for  provincial  departments  and  vital
information  not  being  shared  within  and  between  agencies  at  various
governmental levels.7
A  reliance  on  national  government  departments  for  funding  and  technical
support  could impede effective counter-trafficking measures and operations due
to  the  institutional  delays  often  complained  about  by  anti-trafficking
practitioners  (Interviews,  Durban,  2011–2012;  Part.  Obs.,  Durban,  2013).  This
has  already  been  borne  out  in  the  lack  of  funding  and  support  received  by
provincial task teams established at  the directive  of the NPA as part of a three
year European Commission funded programme of assistance to the South African
government to prevent and react to human trafficking.
Indeed,  the  European  Commission  provided  €6.3  million  toward  the
implementation  of  the  Tsireledzani  programme  (to  establish  local  governance
structures to address human trafficking) which would occur in two phases, from
December 2010 to December 2012.8 A mid-term review found that the programme
was  overly  ambitious  and was  ‘rated  not  satisfactory  due  to  numerous  delays,
inadequate  synergy  between  Result  Areas  and  inadequate  communication
between [the]  National  Task  Team,  and Provincial  Task  Team Members’ (du
Plessis and Collin 2010, 4).
Result  area  2,  establishing  South  African  counter-trafficking  governance
structures in the form of task teams, was found by du Plessis and Collin  (2010) to
be  the  most  problematic  and  least  successful  area  of  the  programme.  This  was
attributed to  the lack of both a  comprehensive  anti-trafficking  legislation  and  an
official  mandate  and  the  questionable  capacity  of  the  NPA  ‘to  implement  on
provincial and lower levels of government and clarity on future implementation
modality’ (du Plessis and Collin 2010, 14). The informal  manner  in  which  the
programme  was  introduced  has  reinforced  the  ad  hoc  manner  that
representatives at a national level were appointed, further compounding issues of
coordination within some of the key stakeholder departments (du Plessis and Collin
2010).
Such  issues  are  replicated  at  the  provincial  level  where  a  high  turnover  of
departmental  representatives has a negative impact on consistency, efficiency and
accountability  (Interviews,  Durban  and  Johannesburg  2011,  2012;  Part.  Obs.,
Durban, 2009–2013). In addition, none of the allocated funds for result area 2 were
devolved to the provincial  level once  provincial task teams had been established
(Part.  Obs.,  Durban,  2010–2012).  The national  task  team,  which  comprises  key
stakeholder  government  departments,  international  organisations  and  one  civil
society organisation, has provided little formal direction or  oversight of counter-
trafficking  measures  or  teams  at  the  provincial  level.  There  is  a  lack  of
coordination  and  cooperation  from  the  national  level  –  as  information  flows
upwards  but  does  not  filter  down  to  and  between  the  provincial  levels
(Interviews,  Durban,  2011–2012).  This  is  also  ascribed  to  the  lack  of  an
operational national plan of action (although one was officially launched with the
Tsireledzani programme in 2010). Analogous with international experience, South
Africa lacks a systematic, sustainable plan of action ‘endowed with financial and
personnel investment’ (Limanowska and Konrad 2009, 448) from government.
For an effective counter-trafficking system to be established in South Africa key
stakeholder departments must be reflective of the successes and challenges faced
in  implementing  the  Tsireledzani  programme  –  especially  in  coordination,
allocation of budgets and formalised cooperation. The administration of the Act
lies with the Department of
Justice and Constitutional Development (DJCD) and is dealt with in Chapter 9 of
the TIP Act providing for the coordination of responsibilities and functions of the
government  departments  listed  therein.9 However,  no  formal  coordination
mechanism is provided  that will cater for this from the outset,10 although it was
reported by the DJCD that:
[t]he  relevant  departments  concerned  had  set  up  a  national,  operational
interdepartmental  committee to examine all the compliance provisions. The
current  state  of  the  draft  national  policy  framework  was  agreement  on
principles, with a view to developing it into a more substantial document to
be  tabled  to  the  Justice,  Crime Prevention,  and  Security  (JCPS)  Cluster
Directors-General Forum. (SCDSC, 27 November 2012b)
It remains to be seen whether sufficient financial and personnel investment will be
provided for anti-trafficking measures. Already, reluctance has been displayed by
lawmakers,  as  some  question  the  lack  of  available  statistics  and  hence  the
pervasiveness  of  the  crime  (see  JCDPC,  23  August  2011,  and  SCDSC,  21
November 2012a). The role of and costs incurred to the provinces still needs to
be established.
However,  therein  lies  the  paradox  as  human  trafficking  is  yet  to  be  fully
criminalised under South African law thus no centralised databases that collate and
verify  human  trafficking  cases  exist.  Each  government  department  works  in
isolation  from others.  The  Department  of  Health  does  not  record  suspected
human  trafficking  cases  as  they  collect  statistics  on  rape,  sexual  assault  or
other  trauma (Part.  Obs.,  Durban,  2013).  Relying solely on reported cases that
result  in  prosecution  is  problematic.  Cases  will  not  make  it  to  court  if
victims/witnesses refuse to testify (Interviews, Durban, 2011; Part. Obs., Durban,
2013). This skews reporting on the actual number of victims detected and assisted.
Such  issues  mirror  concerns  already  expressed  internationally  (see  Friesendorf
2009). As Weiner and Hala point out,
[e]ven as general awareness of human trafficking grows, reporting will lag
until  first  responders and vulnerable individuals and communities become
familiar with the specific elements and dynamics of this ‘new crime’, the
sanctions established for offenders, the protections available to victims, and
the practical tools available for its identification. (2008, viii)
This  is  a  cautionary  note  for  policy-makers  who  base  resource  allocation  on  the
number of victims assisted. Human trafficking is a hidden crime. Visible victims
are hard to find as  victim identification, largely reactive, remains a challenge for
anti-trafficking  practitioners  and responsible  government  agencies  (Emser  2015;
Farrell et al. 2012; UNODC 2007).
Counter-trafficking networks established primarily  by NGOs and faith-based
organisations presently represent  much more cohesive and coordinated informal
governance structures in South Africa. These informal counter-trafficking networks
coincide with formalised counter-trafficking systems. They attempt to fill gaps
and  problems  identified  by  anti-trafficking  practitioners  by  networking,
advocacy and information sharing  through the integration of information flows
and knowledge management. Such parallel structures provide important leverage for
organisations that play a vital role in anti-trafficking. Formalised cooperation and
coordination  of  anti-trafficking  actors  would  help  circumvent  many  of  the
challenges  inherent  in  current  counter-trafficking  systems  –  such  as  negative
competition,  lack  of  trust  and  information  sharing,  problems  of  ownership  and
jurisdiction, bureaucratic complexity (Williams 2009).
Counter-trafficking governance in KwaZulu-Natal
The Tsireledzani programme, in conjunction with the establishment of a national
action  plan based on the pillars of prevention, victim support and response were
supposed  to  provide a  blueprint  for  anti-trafficking in  South Africa  (NPA 2009).
Result area 2 of the programme provided for an enhanced coordinated cross-sector
response, through the establishment of provincial task teams and the development
of provincial  action plans,  to  ensure ‘effective implementation of the strategy at
provincial level’ (NPA 2009, 5). The establishment of the KZN task team fulfils this
strategic  objective.  It  is  the  oldest  provincial  counter-trafficking  task  team in  the
country  and  comprises  representatives  from  key  government  departments,
international organisations and civil society present in KwaZuluNatal.
The  KZN task  team is  unique  in  composition,  established  to  address  human
trafficking  and  pornography,  prostitution  and  brothels.  Thus,  the  task  team
addresses broader issues than the national task team, and focuses on forms of sexual
exploitation. Moreover, while  mandated by the national  task team to prevent and
combat human trafficking in the province, it has no budget or dedicated financial
assistance to implement the national strategy. As a member of the KZN task team
indicated:
if you look at our task team, we have been in operation since 2008.
We have not received one cent of any budget for anything we have
done  And  if  you  think  of  all  our  reports  that  are  going  to
government, there haven’t been any real results from it  (Interview,
February 2012).
This suggests that the establishment of counter-trafficking governance structures
at the sub-state level have taken place on an ad hoc basis resulting in an operational
disconnect  between  the  national  and  provincial  levels.  Moreover,  lack  of
direction and effective coordination at the national level creates weaknesses in a
counter-trafficking  system  yet  to  be  formalised  by  national  law  and  policy.
Provincial task teams have been left to their own devices – to figure out how to
prevent  and  combat  human  trafficking,  whilst  coordinating  the  activities  of
provincial  government departments,  many of whose representatives  do  not  have
decision-making powers  and are  unable  to  hold  departments  accountable (Part.
Obs., Durban, 2009–2013). A lack of national and provincial directives,  guidelines
and instructions for the various departments and law enforcement agencies  has
hampered a coordinated and integrated response by the provincial task team.
The strategic objectives of the task team are aligned to international norms and
strategies of prevention, protection, prosecution and partnerships (4P model). This
model  is  derived  from  Adv.  Coleman’s  comparative  research  into  how
countries  such  as  Denmark,  Ireland,  Kosovo,  Pakistan,  Turkey  and  the  United
Kingdom  deal  with  human  trafficking  (Interview,  Durban,  September  2011).  It
represents both a logical extension of the 3P policy dimension of the United States’
Trafficking in Persons Report (both a diplomatic tool and compliance mechanism
to monitor and evaluate states’  counter-trafficking  efforts)  and the realisation
that  multi-layered  partnerships  are  needed  to  effectively  address  trafficking.
According to Coleman (2011) and the National Prosecuting Authority (2009, 9–10)
it  aims  to:  (i)  increase  knowledge,  education  and  awareness  about  human
trafficking,  pornography,  prostitution  and brothels  to  empower  all  communities
(prevention),  (ii)  deliver  a  holistic  provision  services  that  turns  victims  of
human trafficking,
prostitution, pornography and brothels into survivors (protection), (iii) ensure that
apposite  processes  are  in  place  to  investigate  and  prosecute  such  cases
(prosecution)  and  (iv)  encourage  multisectoral  partnerships  amongst
governments,  NGOs and the community  to  monitor  and  address  the  causes  of
human  trafficking,  pornography,  prostitution  and  brothels  (partnerships).  The
individual  dimensions  of  the  KwaZulu-Natal  counter-trafficking  system  are
analysed below.
Prevention
South  African  prevention  strategies  have  been  formalised  by  the  TIP  Act,  and
demonstrate  a combination of existing supply-based,11 demand-based12 and reducing
financial  gains  of  trafficking13 policies.  Prevention  ‘has  been  governments’  least
employed tactic. Part of this  inattention results  from the lack of  mechanisms by
which to measure the impacts and success of prevention programs in achieving
their intended results’ (Shinkle 2007, 3). This is also noted in the South African
context.
One of the core functions of the KZN task team is to prevent cases of human
trafficking  through  education,  training  of  key  government  role  players  and
awareness-raising.  This  is  achieved  through  primary  level  prevention  strategies
(Part.  Obs.  Durban,  2009–2013).  ‘The  term “prevention”  is  used  to  describe  a
huge  range  of  anti-trafficking  interventions  and  has  accounted  for  a  large
proportion  of  the  investment  in  anti-trafficking’  (Marshall  2012, 5).
Awareness  campaigns  form  the  crux  of  the  task  team’s  prevention  activities.
This is on par with most international prevention models. While this strategy is
invaluable in stimulating debate and creating awareness ‘on the risks associated
with trafficking’  (GETHBEC 2010, 15), it  is not an effective tool in preventing
trafficking. Awareness campaigns do not address the root causes of the problem
which are deeply embedded in the socio-political structures of society. Primary
prevention strategies place a positive  burden on individuals, including children,
to protect themselves from being trafficked.
Primary prevention strategies are drawn from interventions to prevent gender-
based  violence.  Human  trafficking  is  often  equated  to  a  form  of  gender-based
violence,  or  intimately  connected  thereto,  by  practitioners,  governments  and
intergovernmental  organisations  (see  Chuang 2006; Clark 2003; Jordan 2002;
Todres 2006; Watts  and  Zimmerman  2002). A  gender  bias  has  resulted  in
prevention strategies and the anti-trafficking discourse. This is in part attributable
to the fact that women and girls are disproportionately affected. In addition, most
victims  assisted  were  extricated  from  situations  of  sexual  exploitation  (typically
forced prostitution). A continued lack of formal screening procedures, particularly
by law enforcement  and other  government  departments,  has  resulted in  victims
from vulnerable sub-populations (i.e. illegal migrants and sex workers) not being
identified  as victims of trafficking.  This is  particularly true in the case of labour
trafficking,  which  evidence  suggests  far  exceeds  trafficking  for  commercial
sexual exploitation.14 In South Africa, the limited statistics which do exist show
this.  Eighty per  cent  of  all  trafficked  persons assisted, and cases prosecuted, in
KwaZulu-Natal were those who had been trafficked for sexual exploitation (Pers.
Obs., Durban 2011–2012; Interview, Pietermaritzburg,  November 2011; Interview,
Durban, April 2012).
Critics maintain this is due to a skewed focus by governments and NGOs on
trafficking for sexual exploitation because they seek the abolition of prostitution,
and  conflate  voluntary  prostitution  with  human  trafficking  (see  Chuang 2010;
Weitzer 2007; Wharton 2010).
Indeed,  this  misalignment  of  ideological,  moral  and  political  agendas  has  a
negative  effect  on  preventing  other  forms  of  human trafficking  that  are  tied  to
labour and the global economy. Efforts to prevent other forms of trafficking and
assist these categories of victims (especially men) have been overlooked by anti-
trafficking practitioners in South Africa (see US TIP Reports). This is in part due
to the late introduction of comprehensive anti-trafficking legislation.
A  common  theme  amongst  South  African  anti-trafficking  practitioners,
particularly NGOs,  is the use of gendered language. Victims of trafficking are
referred  to  as  ‘girls’  (Pers.  Obs.,  Interviews,  Durban,  2011–2012;  Interviews,
Johannesburg,  2011–2012).  This  has  an  impact  on  the  provision  of  support
services to male victims, such as the lack of shelter accommodation and access
to rehabilitation programmes. The 2012 Global Report on Human Trafficking
indicates  that  Africa  and the Middle  East  reported ‘an  overall higher share of
victims trafficked for forced labour compared with other regions’ (UNODC 2012,
76).  Thus,  if  anti-trafficking  practitioners  are  not  looking  for  other  forms  of
trafficking, a multitude of victims will remain unidentified and unassisted.
Primary prevention strategies,  in  the  form of  awareness-raising campaigns and
school  presentations  are  geared  toward  school-going  children,  a  particularly
vulnerable  sub-population  in  South  Africa.  According  to  the  United  Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC 2014) children comprise 73.5% of reported
cases  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa  –  the  highest  share  of  child  trafficking  in  the
world.  Bermudez  claims  that  most  domestic  victims  of  trafficking  in  South
Africa  tend  to  be  young  black  South  African  females  under  the  age  of  20,
followed  by  those  aged  21–30  (Bermudez  2008,  31).  Indeed,  reported  cases  in
Durban support this (Part. Obs., Durban, 2012–2013). The demographic profile of
foreign victims is more heterogeneous (see US TIP Report 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014;
LNSA HTA Index Report 2013, 2014, 2015).
The  provincial  task  team  uses  multimedia  and  ‘low  tech’  presentations  to
engage with  school children, educators and the public on the human trafficking
risks including the various forms of trafficking. The task team uses Justice Acts’
presenter’s manual Traffick  Proof in conjunction with their own DVD on human
trafficking.  There  is  also  technical  training  for  task  team members.  Awareness-
raising also takes place at public events, through public talks and press releases.
These initiatives are largely conducted by NGOs who form part of the task team.
Such initiatives  are  not  supported  by  any form of  dedicated  budget.  A lack of
funding  means  that  most  primary  prevention  measures  remain  limited  to  urban
areas. Rural areas remain largely inaccessible and neglected.
Training of key government role players in broad policy areas (law enforcement,
health, labour, education, social development, home affairs and community safety) is
an area of prevention in which the task team has demonstrated measurable success
in  terms  of  numbers reached (Part.  Obs.,  Durban,  2009–2013).  Training includes
victim identification,  legislation and investigatory techniques in human trafficking.
However, while primary prevention strategies are measured in terms of quarterly
and annual reports that are used as indices for the progress of task team’s annual
action  plan,  no  final  impact  evaluation  of  these prevention strategies  has  taken
place (Part. Obs., Durban, 2009–2013). While evaluation of the impact of strategies
has been noted by the task team as being much needed, a  lack of official funding
prevents them from assessing the efficacy of such measures (Part.  Obs.,  Durban,
2012). Thus, it  remains unknown in the South Africa context as to the impact  of
awareness-raising programmes which are predominantly focused on highlighting
‘the symptoms of  trafficking as  opposed to addressing the root  causes  of the
problem’ (GETHBEC 2010, 11) like elsewhere in the world.
Dixon cautions  that  ‘[p]revention messages  may unknowingly contribute  to  the
stigmas surrounding a trafficked person, notably in the way they portray the negative
results  of  a  trafficking  situation’ (2008, 87).  A  consequence  of  this  is  the  re-
victimisation of domestically trafficked persons once repatriated. The evaluation of
existing  prevention  strategies  should  become  a  policy  prerogative  for  those
government  departments  charged  with  the  establishment  of  public  awareness
programmes  by  the  TIP  Act.  Moreover,  the  intersection  and  development  of
secondary15 and  tertiary16 stage  prevention  strategies  with  primary  prevention
programmes needs to be considered by both the provincial task team (in fulfilment
of its current mandate) and at the national level. Unless effective primary prevention
programmes are combined with secondary and tertiary stage prevention strategies,
a holistic, victim-centred approach envisioned by the TIP Act will not be realised.
These strategies could be combined with larger programmes aimed at preventing
gender-based  violence  which  address  intersecting  root  causes  that  foment
vulnerability and environments of exploitation. Together with a lack of dedicated
funding  for  extensive  prevention  measures,  the  results  of  this  aspect  of  the  task
team’s  4P  model  are  mixed.  More  logistical,  financial  and  personnel  support  is
required whether this be at a national or provincial level.
Protection
In  line  with  the  trafficking  protocol  and  TIP  Act,  the  provincial  task  team’s
protection  strategy  is  oriented  toward  providing  holistic  services  to  victims  of
human trafficking. The strategic goal of its protection component is to empower
victims to become survivors (NPA 2009, 11) through access to comprehensive
support services (such as healthcare,  shelter, rehabilitation and reintegration).
The provincial task team’s victim-centred approach seeks to eradicate secondary
victimisation, increase survivors’ state of health,  restore their dignity and ensure
access to justice and reintegrate victims with their families (NPA 2009, 11).
Protection  is  largely  the  institutional  remit  of  the  Department  of  Social
Development  (DSD).  This  is  mirrored  in  the  TIP  Act  in  terms  of  assessing
whether a suspected victim  of  trafficking  is  indeed so  and providing  support
services  aimed  at  the  rehabilitation  and  reintegration  of  extracted  victims.
Support  services  have  been  devolved  to  NGOs  which  provide  shelter
accommodation  and  psycho-social  services  (rehabilitation  and  reintegration
programmes). This is also reflected in Chapter 5 of the TIP Act which provides for
the  accreditation  of  organisations  to  provide  services  to  adult  victims  of
trafficking by the DSD. Child victims of trafficking are dealt with separately (under
the Children’s Act) and are placed by the DSD into places of safety and children’s
homes.17
In the period under study, adult victim protection and assistance is provided by
nongovernmental  accredited  multipurpose  shelters  and  social  workers  who
complained  of  insufficient  funding.  This  results  in  tension  between  the
Department  and  support  service  providers  who feel  that  they are  insufficiently
resourced to provide adequate rehabilitation  for  survivors  –  including  access  to
onsite  healthcare  and  therapeutic  services  (Pers.  Obs.,  Durban,  2011–2012;
Interview, Durban, April 2012). However, the DSD recognises that with the advent
of  comprehensive  anti-trafficking  legislation,  it  must  ensure  that  there  are
enough accredited shelters for suspected victims of trafficking. In
KwaZulu-Natal, which had the second highest concentration of assisted victims of
trafficking nationally for the 2011–2012 reporting period (DSD 2012) there are
only two accredited short-term multipurpose shelters that  accommodate adult
female  victims of  trafficking. There is only one shelter in the country, based in
Gauteng,  that  can  provide  services  for  male  victims  of  trafficking  (Part.  Obs.,
Durban,  2012–2013) who are systematically  denied  access  to  rehabilitation  and
reintegration programmes as a result.
Indeed,  the  South African government has  been found wanting in successive
Trafficking in Persons Reports released by the United States government (see TIP
Report 2012, 2013, 2014) to recognise and address labour trafficking,18 and protect
and provide assistance to these victims (who tend to be either children or foreign
males)  often  resulting  in  the  summary  deportation  of  foreign  victims  by  the
Department  of  Home  Affairs.  This  echoes  an  assessment  by  Cho,  Dreher,  and
Neumayer (2011) who scored South Africa’s protection measures 2 out of 5. This
rating  is  supported  by  the  piecemeal  approach  that  has  been  taken  in  South
Africa  to  provide  protection  and  assistance  to  victims  of  trafficking  (seemingly
limited at present to female victims of sexual exploitation), a lack of shelters that
can accommodate victims of trafficking in general, and men in particular, a lack of
long-term specialised facilities and transitional housing, a general lack of capacity
and financial support for service providers. Such concerns are mirrored to varying
degrees in the case of KwaZulu-Natal and task team efforts to protect and assist
victims of trafficking.
Shelter  accommodation is  limited  to  short-term,  multipurpose shelters.  There
are  no  shelters  in  KwaZulu-Natal  that  exclusively  fulfil  the  individual  and
unique needs of victims of trafficking. In addition, shelters and safe houses are not
designed to take in trafficked victims with older children or male victims. In one
instance, a witness in a trafficking case who had a child could not be placed at one
of the shelters, and she eventually declined to come forward as a result (Interview,
Durban, March 2012). In another instance, male victims of labour trafficking were
extricated from a situation of extreme exploitation  but  could not  be placed in a
shelter  or  receive  rehabilitative  or  therapeutic  care  as  there  were no accredited
shelters  equipped to take in  male  victims in  that  region or  the  large  number of
victims in the case (Part. Obs., Durban, January 2013). The slow pace to recognise
men as victims of trafficking represents a glaring omission on the part of the DSD
and NGO service providers. It also reinforces the notion of a gender bias amongst
anti-trafficking practitioners where male victims are neglected.
Moreover, because multipurpose shelters are short-term adult female victims of
trafficking who have been for the most part extricated from the sex industry and
were  subjected  to  extreme  and  prolonged  abuse  (physical,  sexual,  mental  and
emotional) and complex trauma only have access to rehabilitative and therapeutic
services for a period of three months. Such experiences before, during and after
trafficking  present  as  short  and  long-term problems – physical,  psychological
and  behavioural  (see  Zimmerman  2003;  Zimmerman and Borland 2009).  Also,
victims of trafficking are placed with victims of domestic abuse, neglect or sexual
assault  who  have  different  experiences  and  needs  and  do  not  cohabit  well
together (Pers. Obs., Durban, March 2012; Interview, Johannesburg, April 2011;
Interview,  Durban,  January  2013).  Moreover,  ‘[s]ystemic  hurdles  continue  to
inhibit  progress  in  providing  justice  and  protection  for  victims  in  South
Africa’  (TIP  Report 2014). Many victims are substance dependant and require
detoxification  before  they  can  enter  rehabilitation  programmes  or  witness
protection. However, a lack of
publically funded facilities has resulted in assisted victims absconding from care
(Interviews,  Durban,  March  and  April  2012).  Compounding  this  is  a  lack  of
language interpretation for victims which impacts on services provided and access
to justice, and the failure to provide adequate security for victims at places of safety
(preventing some NGOs from accepting victims). Of greater concern is the inability
to recognise the emotional trauma victims endured19 (TIP Report 2014). As a result
of their trafficking experience, victims of  trafficking require individual,  culturally
appropriate care (Zimmerman and Borland 2009, 33).
The  Open  Door  Crisis  Care  Centre  (ODCCC),  an  accredited  short-term,
multipurpose  shelter  in  KwaZulu-Natal  provides  trauma-informed  care
(Zimmerman and Borland  2009) based on international good practice for adult
female victims of trafficking. It provides an integral link between the task team’s
protection strategy and support services for assisted victims. However, while the
ODCCC  provides  short-term  rehabilitative  programmes  to  assist  and  stabilise
victims of trafficking, there are currently no secondary rehabilitation programmes
or  facilities  for  survivors  once  they  exit  the  shelter.  Thus,  long-term
rehabilitation  and  reintegration  services  and  transitional  housing  are  lacking.
Tertiary stage prevention  strategies,  which  seek to  reduce  the vulnerability  of
survivors  of  being  re-trafficked or  becoming second wave  recruiters,  have  not
been realised.  This  has been recognised by some members of the task team as a
serious problem warranting attention (Part. Obs., Durban, 2012–2013). Indeed, Red
Light Anti-Trafficking Initiative, a faith-based organisation active in prevention
and protection, has been vocal in this regard and is attempting to address this in
the  form  of  a  drop-in  centre.  The  extension  of  secondary  rehabilitation  and
reintegration services that substantively address the long-term recovery needs of
assisted victims should be addressed by the DSD with the  operationalisation  of
legislation and accompanying policy framework.20
One  of  the  greatest  stumbling  blocks  faced  by  the  task  team  is  a  lack  of  a
coordinated  approach  in  victim  identification  and  assistance.  As  coordination
mechanisms (in the form  of directives,  guidelines or instructions to various key
government  role  players  and  law  enforcement)  are  currently  not  in  place  at  the
national  level,  this  impacts  the  ability  of  provincial  task  teams  to  formalise
cooperation and coordinate responses of key role players at the provincial and local
level. As witnessed in KwaZulu-Natal, a continued lack of a rapid response team
and operational  trafficking protocol  has meant  that  there have been coordinating
challenges  resulting  in  blurred  roles  and  responsibilities,  a  perceived  lack  of
response to the reporting of suspected cases of trafficking and perceived delays in
investigations, victim identification, extraction and referral and a failure to use the
correct  channels  (Interview,  Durban,  March 2012;  Part.  Obs.,  Durban,  2012).  In
one  instance,  victims  were  referred  to  non-accredited  shelters  where  their
personal  safety  and anonymity  were placed at  risk (Part.  Obs.,  Durban,  2012).
Coordination is thus critical.
NGOs and faith-based organisations involved in sex worker outreach report that
potential witnesses are often unwilling to provide statements or open cases at their
local  police  stations.  Police  officers  are  accused of  ‘collecting  taxes’  from sex
workers (Interviews,  Durban, February and March 2012). This suggests that some
police officers are corrupt, victimise highly vulnerable sub-populations engaged in
illicit activities (like sex workers21) and are indirectly in collusion with trafficking
operations. Mistrust of law enforcement personnel remains high among sex workers
and impacts negatively on the reporting of suspected cases of human trafficking,
which NGOs cannot do on behalf of sex workers. A direct witness account and
signed  statement  is  required  for  a  case  to  be  opened.  However,  in  trafficking
prevention,  sex  workers  educated  on  human  trafficking  are  a  valuable  asset  in
providing  intelligence,  particularly  in  identifying  and  extricating  child  victims.
This is more so if good relationships are forged between them and NGOs (see, for
example, Jordan 2011).
The task team, with the aid of members from civil  society, as part of its wider
mandate attempts to assist sex workers to leave the industry. Sex workers are viewed
as  a  sub-population  particularly  vulnerable  to  being  abused,  exploited  and
trafficked. Sex worker outreach at present is limited to street-based prostitution
in a  number  of  key areas  in  greater  Durban.  In a case dating back to 2012,  a
faith-based organisation’s contact to street-based sex workers through their sex
worker  street  ministry  resulted  in  them  being  alerted  to  a  case  of  human
trafficking involving minors (Interview, March 2012).  The willingness of these
sex workers to come forward and report the case resulted in an investigation by
the Hawks and 16 young women and girls  were rescued from a  brothel.  Five
people, including the building owner and his wife, were charged with  human
trafficking  and  running  a  brothel.  In  total  they  have  been  charged  with  156
charges  including  assault,  rape,  sexual  exploitation  of  a  child  and  racketeering
(‘Human Trafficking Trial Continues in Durban’, 25 January 2013). This is seen as
one of the most successful raids by the task team to date.
Despite  this  success,  a  major  concern  raised  by  the  task  team  was  the
involvement of  the media (present on the scene) in the raid, viewed as a significant
breach of victim confidentiality. Members of the task team voiced concern about
information  leaks  to  the  media  about  the  pending  raid,  their  presence  on  the
scene,  the publication of what  appeared to be official  police photographs,  and
comments about the case by members of the task team who did not know all the
facts (Part. Obs., Durban, March 2012). All this could have jeopardised not only
the safety and anonymity of the victims and witnesses, but also the case.
This incident resulted in the task team re-evaluating the way in which it protects
information.  Leaked  information,  whether  to  the  media  or  others,  represents  a
security  threat  in  terms  of  disruptive  operations  and  victim  protection.  Such
information could tip  off  trafficking  networks  or  corrupt  officials  who  could
evade justice or seek out rescued victims. In an attempt to mitigate the potential
for sensitive information leaks,  the task  team now requires all  existing and new
members to sign a confidentiality and non-disclosure  agreement  which prohibits
them  from  discussing  or  disseminating  information  pertaining  to  task  team
meetings (Part. Obs., Durban, 2012–2013). Members who breach this agreement
are  ejected  from  the  task  team.  This  marks  a  significant  step  forward  in  the
evolution of the counter-trafficking system in KwaZulu-Natal, and protection of
data and strategies. Other task teams have not yet learnt this lesson, and appear to
be  somewhat  reluctant  to  follow suit,  although  the  reasons  for  this  are  unclear
(Interview,  Johannesburg,  April  2013).  Another  important  security  measure
currently lacking in  all  task  teams is  the vetting of its members.22 Membership
remains relatively open, and a high  member turnover means new members are a
constant  factor,  opening  the  possibility  of  membership  to  individuals  who  are
linked to trafficking operations or corrupt public officials.
While the task team has developed a protection and victim assistance strategy aimed
at  empowering  victims,  which  is  comparable  to  similar  counter-trafficking
efforts across
South  Africa,  certain  operational  issues  coupled  with  a  lack  of  a  policy
framework  mean  that  protection  measures  lag  behind  international  norms.
Particular  sub-populations  of  trafficking  victims  remain  under-assisted  despite
institutional  provisions.  A  lack  of  specialised,  long-term  care  facilities  and
programmes  for  victims  can  have  future  consequences.  Anti-trafficking
practitioners need to shift their focus from one group of trafficking victims (females
trafficked for  sexual  exploitation)  to  include  the entire  spectrum of  trafficking
victims already identified in the South African context  (male victims trafficked
into  situations outside the sex industry and parents with children).  This  is  being
realised  incrementally  within the  task team (Part.  Obs.,  Durban,  2013).  A strong
protection component is vital  for any counter-trafficking system that claims to be
victim-centred.
Prosecution
The third component of the task team’s counter-trafficking model is prosecution. The
term  prosecution  is  used  to  denote  both  law  enforcement  counter-trafficking
investigations  and  disruptive  operations  and  criminal  justice  prosecution  by  the
NPA. Due to the sensitive nature of on-going investigations, planned raids, strategies
and court cases,  this  part  of  the  task team meets separately. These representatives
report back to the main task team at bimonthly meetings on the progress of court
cases (Part. Obs., Durban, 2009–2013).
In  ensuring  a  successful  prosecution  component  of  this  counter-trafficking
model,  it  is  integral that law enforcement and the NPA work hand-in-hand. Inter-
agency cooperation, coordination, dialogue, transparency and integrity are thus vital.
However, this is an area where significant challenges and potential threats have been
observed (Part. Obs., Durban, 2009–2013; Interviews, Durban, 2011–2013). Human
trafficking  cases  are  handled  by  a  specialised  unit  of  the  South  African  Police
Service’s Directorate of Priority Crime Investigation (DPCI), the Hawks. Provincial
human  trafficking  investigations  are  managed  by  its  provincial  coordinator.  The
human trafficking division forms a vital component of the prosecution side of the
task team. Currently, the Hawks are the only division mandated to investigate cases
of human trafficking because of its perceived links to international organised crime.
Its counter-trafficking activities are highly structured and only cases with links to
international  organised  crime  within  a  structured  criminal  business  market  are
handled.  Suspected  domestic  cases  (i.e.  those  without  a  link  to  international
organised  crime)  are  deferred  to  primary  law  enforcement  (Interview,  Durban,
April 2012).
Primary law enforcement officials are viewed by a number of anti-trafficking
practitioners as complicit in illicit activities – some of which intersect with human
trafficking  (Interviews, Durban, 2011–2012). Indeed, in a major case involving the
intersection of trafficking for sexual exploitation, sex work and illicit migration,23 it
was alleged the owners of  the brothel  would ‘use the corrupt  police to scare the
girls, telling them if they refused to obey their orders they would be thrown into jail
for being in the country illegally’ (Ngalawa 2006).
Moreover, as human trafficking investigations are highly technical,  extensive
training will be required of detectives and officers in primary law enforcement
once  legislation  is  operationalised,  to  ensure  that  they  have  the  necessary
knowledge  and  skills  to  identify  and  assist  victims  of  trafficking.  However,  the
general perception of a ‘corrupt police force’ undermines confidence in the ability of
primary  law enforcement  to  investigate  suspected  cases  of  domestic  trafficking.
While such blanket statements are disingenuous to those law
enforcement officials who are dedicated to upholding the law and fulfilling their
mandate, there are some truths in these concerns that must be addressed. One is the
issue of corruption and collusion by police and other public sector officials, the
private sector and even anti-trafficking practitioners from civil society.
Corruption  is  perceived  to  be  a  causal  factor  facilitating  human  trafficking
(Holmes  2009;  Transparency  International  2011;  UNODC  2011).  Zhang  and
Pineda  (2008)  suggest  that  corruption  is  the  key  factor  in  explaining  the
pervasiveness  and  persistence  of  human  trafficking  and  the  driving  force
behind  the  phenomenon.  Corruption  plays  a  role  during  every  stage  of  the
trafficking process (Transparency International 2011) and  negatively  impacts  on
investigations, prosecutions and the protection of victims (UNODC 2011, 4).
While these concerns are recognised by some individuals in the task team, little is
done formally to address it (Part. Obs., Durban, 2009–2013). This is a question of
responsibility  and  accountability  –  how  does  a  task  team  reign  in  individual
government  departments  without  any  mandate  or  powers  to  do  so?  Instead  of
directly  countenancing  corrupt  practices  that  impact  on  human  trafficking
operations, the team has sought to shield its most sensitive operations by restricting
access to them. The task team’s confidentiality and nondisclosure agreement and the
creation of select sub-committees show this.
Despite this, the DPCI has had notable successes. In the absence of comprehensive
anti-trafficking legislation criminalising human trafficking in all its forms, the DPCI
(like its prosecutorial counterpart, the NPA) uses a variety of available legislation,
such  as  the  Prevention  of  Organised  Crime  Act  12  of  1998,  Prevention  and
Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004, Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977
(and various amendments), Criminal Law (Sexual  Offences Amendment Act) 32 of
2007 and various municipal by-laws. Indeed, an interviewee from this sector does
not see the lack of comprehensive legislation as an impediment to investigating and
prosecuting cases of trafficking (Interview,  April  2012).  His team in collaboration
with extensively trained  Metro  police  officers,  the  fire  department,  building  and
health inspectorates have successfully used by-laws to shut down the premises of
suspected trafficking. Moreover, utilising by-laws, as opposed to other pieces of
legislation,  means that these officials have the mandate and authority to enter and
inspect properties suspected of housing human trafficking operations without search
and seizure warrants (Interview, April 2012).
The prosecutorial side represents one of the task team’s strongest components.
The first successfully tried case of human trafficking for sexual exploitation in
South Africa  was prosecuted by a member of the KZN task team. For a brief
moment in time, The  State v Basheer Sayed and Another represented a victory
against  human  trafficking  in  South  Africa  and the  realisation  of  a  successfully
coordinated approach to  its  investigation  and prosecution.24 However,  owing  to
mistakes on the court’s part in swearing in and vetting the Thai interpreter, the
conviction was set aside upon review on 25 June 2012  in the Pietermaritzburg
High Court.25 A new trial, which is currently underway at the  Durban Regional
Court,  was  summarily  ordered.  This  judgment  dealt  a  significant  blow  to  the
prosecutor and investigating officer who not only had to try and locate the wit -
nesses who had returned to Thailand, but also convince them to return and face
the  psychological  ordeal  of  having to relive their  experiences before  the  court
and  testify  again  (Interview,  November  2012).  It  remains  to  be  seen  whether
justice will be served  in this case. However, this case shows that not only are
specialised prosecutorial and
investigative units required, but also the judiciary needs to be educated and trained
in dealing with cases of human trafficking (and particular procedural requirements
surrounding the submission of evidence via interpreters).
Thus,  while  the  core  investigatory  and  prosecutorial  components  of  the
prosecution  side  of  the  task  team are  relatively  strong  in  and  of  themselves,  a
number  of  linked  institutional  and  systemic  threats  and  challenges  relating  to
primary law enforcement, corruption and the judicial system need to be addressed
by the DJCD, in collaboration with other relevant departments and included in the
national policy framework.
Partnerships
Partnerships at  multiple levels form an integral  part  of  the task team, laying the
foundation  for  an  integrated  counter-trafficking  system  in  KwaZulu-Natal.  This
fourth dimension of counter-trafficking is an important, yet sometimes overlooked
one, in other counter-trafficking systems and often represents the greatest hindrance
to effective coordination and cooperation. In order for counter-trafficking governance
to  be  effective,  institutionalised  cooperation and coordination within and between
agencies and organisations is required.  Networked partnerships with open flows of
communication and dialogue which leverage resources, skills and capabilities and
work  toward  a  common  purpose  are  invaluable  in  creating  a  holistic  counter-
trafficking  approach.  The  task  team  attempts  to  follow  a  synergistic  approach,
however, impediments to its realisation are observed.
The true strength of the KwaZulu-Natal task team lies with emphasis on and
nurturing  of  partnerships.  Networked  partnerships  galvanised  through
membership with the task team and a strong leadership are the key. The Chair of the
task team recognised that, ‘Partnerships play a vital role in the provincial task team. I
believe that without this function of the task team – it would not be the success it is,
or even able to operate effectively’ (Interview, Pietermaritzburg, September 2011).
This sentiment is also expressed by its members  (Interviews, Durban, 2011–2012).
By  creating  an  integrated  and  collaborative  team  that  appreciates  diverse
institutional, organisational and experiential perspectives and skills  together in a
forum that permits the sharing of information – it is believed that effective counter-
trafficking strategies may evolve.
The well-structured organisation of the task team, bimonthly general meetings
and  of  its  component  substructures  (such  as  the  long  established  prevention  and
protection  subcommittee;  and  prosecution  subcommittee),  regular  minutes  of
meetings, quarterly and annual reports monitoring progress of the task team’s action
plan,  open  channels  of  communication  amongst  members,  and  wide  support  by
members of the task team for voluntary public awareness events show this (Part.
Obs.,  Durban,  2009–2013).  Such efforts  aimed  at  running  an  efficient  team are
designed  to  help  achieve  the  strategic  objective  of  encouraging  partnerships
between government,  civil  society and communities to  be  monitor and address
the structural factors conducive to human trafficking, prostitution, pornography and
brothels (NPA 2009, 12).
The key priority of the task team in terms of partnerships is the monitoring of the
effectiveness of the task team through quarterly and annual reports, in line with the
task team’s  annual  action plan.  Co-opting representatives  and aligning the task
team  with  strategic  role  players  also  forms  part  of  this  fourth  dimension.
Recently  added components  include the development of a resource library for
efficient knowledge management and
task team driven research into aspects of human trafficking where local knowledge
gaps  exist,  as  well  as  establishing  an  evaluation  mechanism  for  task  team
programmatic strategies (Part. Obs., Durban, 2012–2013).
While the task team is making significant and sustained progress in terms of its
partnership dimension, it also faces on-going challenges. From its inception the
task team adopted a fluid approach to problem-solving that allows it to deal with
institutional  and  budgetary  constraints  brought  about  by  a  high  turnover  of
(government)  representatives,  the  absence  of  comprehensive  legislation  and  a
policy  framework,  and  thus  any  form  of  enforceable  coordination  mechanisms.
Indeed, these constraints have created inherent challenges for the leadership of the
task team to fully define its mandate and delineate roles and responsibilities of
members.  Inter-agency  cooperation  and  coordination  are  a  huge  challenge  –
comparable  to  the  international  counter-trafficking  governance  experience  (see
Friesendorf 2009). High member turnover, especially of key government department
role players, has had a negative effect on task team cohesiveness and efficacy at
times. New members frequently need to be brought up to speed and many do
not  have  decision-making  powers  which  has  an  impact  on  strategies  and
initiatives.  This  has  created  the  impression  amongst  some  longstanding
members,  particularly  from  civil  society,  that  ‘little  is  being  done  by
government departments’ or that they are ‘not  pulling their weight’ (Interviews,
Durban, 2011–2012). Certainly, understanding and commitment about the roles that
the task team plays and could play is lacking by the key government partners. The
task team seems to be treated by some as inconsequential, rather than a significant
– if not the significant – factor in the human trafficking landscape in  KwaZulu-
Natal.  The root of this is systemic, located in the lack of an institutional frame -
work, which in turn hampers the work of the team.
This  appears  to  be  primarily  a  result  of  a  lack  of  formalised  coordination  and
budgetary  constraints,  and  not  necessarily  institutional  reticence.  A  formalised
cooperation and coordination mechanism should be created by the DJCD as part of
the  national  policy  framework,  as  issues  of  cooperation  and  coordination  are
witnessed in other provincial task teams, affecting their cohesiveness and efficacy
(Interviews, Johannesburg, 2011 and  2012). In addition, the significant role that
anti-trafficking  practitioners  from  civil  society  play  in  counter-trafficking
should be recognised by government and provided with more institutional and
financial support. In KwaZulu-Natal and elsewhere, NGOs tend to be the drivers
and  innovators  in  prevention  and  protection  based  counter-trafficking  (Part.
Obs.,  2009–2013).  More  collaborative  relationships  should  be  developed
between  key departmental role players and anti-trafficking organisations to ensure
an efficacious response.
While dedication and strong leadership demonstrated by the provincial task
team’s  core helps drive the task team towards meeting its  objectives,  the real
challenge  that  lies  ahead  is  ensuring  the  accountability  of  role  players.
‘Accountability of all actors is crucial because there are great power dynamics at
work  in  anti-trafficking  approaches  and  attempts  at  assistance’  (Ditmore  and
Thhukral 2012, 135).  Partnerships  need  to  be  proactive  and  mandates  clearly
delineated.
One  vital  aspect  of  the  partnership  dimension  lacking  in  counter-trafficking
systems at  the  provincial  level  in  South  Africa  is  cooperation  and coordination
between task teams. Provincial task teams facilitate cooperation and coordination,
despite  the  absence  of  a  policy  framework.  Moreover,  channels  of
communication flow upward to the national
level – but little information trickles back down. Virtually no formal dialogue
occurs  between provincial  task  teams.  Hence,  strategies  and knowledge  are
not  shared  amongst  anti-trafficking  practitioners.  This  could  result  in  mistakes
being  repeated,  and  innovations,  being  limited.  These  challenges  faced  by  the
KwaZulu-Natal  task  team  are  issues  encountered  by  all,  thus  the  need  for
coordination  and  cooperation  mechanisms  at  multiple  levels  are  vital  for
effective counter-trafficking governance.
Conclusion
The KwaZulu-Natal task team bases its counter-trafficking governance model on four
anti-trafficking dimensions: prevention, protection, prosecution and partnerships. It
is a structurally feasible model that requires formalisation in terms of cooperation and
coordination  mechanisms  emanating  from  a  national  policy  framework  once
comprehensive anti-trafficking legislation is operationalised. Notable successes
of the task team have been realised through strong leadership, strategic planning,
dedication, flexibility and commitment of practitioners, and the inclusion of key role
players.  Collaborative  partnerships  are  entwined  in  every  facet  of  task  team
activities and strategies ranging from the way in which prevention strategies are
implemented,  to  disruptive  operations  are  carried  out,  victims  assisted  and
protected,  and  cases  investigated  and  traffickers  prosecuted.  This  has  also
shaped the consensual decision-making approach that the task team follows. As
a  result,  the  task  team  performs  well  in  terms  of  primary  prevention.  It  has
experienced  variable  results  in  the  areas  of  protection,  prosecution  and
partnerships.
However, this does not imply that this model is neither desirable nor effective.
Rather  institutional  and  funding  constraints  in  the  absence  of  comprehensive
legislation and a national policy framework are impediments to the realisation of
the full potential of this model. If these issues are not dealt with first at the national
level, in the form of a well-conceived  and implemented  policy  framework that
values cooperation and coordination, then there is little hope that provincial task
teams will be able to resolve these challenges on their own. Without financial and
personnel  investment,  underscored  by  political  will  of  the  relevant  government
role  players,  provincial  task  teams  will  continue  to  make  an  impact  in
preventing  and combating  human trafficking  in  South  Africa,  but  this  is  based
upon a volunteerist  approach that  is  not  a long-term solution to preventing and
combating the phenomenon.
A window of opportunity exists in the South African context to change this – to
ensure  that  an  effective  counter-trafficking  governance  structure,  based  on
cooperation and coordination (networked partnerships), is put into place. This can
only be done by incorporating the experiences and lessons learnt from provincial
task  teams,  like  the  KwaZuluNatal  task  team,  to  formulate  a  national  policy
framework  that  will  ensure  the  effective  implementation  of  counter-trafficking
strategies.
Notes
1. While comprehensive anti-trafficking legislation was promulgated in 2013, the
Prevention and Combating Trafficking in Persons Act No. 7 of 2013 is yet to
come  into  effect  as  the  national  policy  framework  is  currently  being
developed. The Act came into operation at the beginning of August 2015. It
remains to be seen whether it will be fully operational or rolled out in phases.
2.This is witnessed in the counter-trafficking system of the United Nations, defined
by the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons,  Especially  Women  and  Children,  Supplementing  the  United
Nations Convention against  Transnational  Organized  Crime (UNGA Res.
55/25 of 2000) (Trafficking Protocol) and linked to the overarching United
Nations  Convention  against  Transnational  Organized  Crime  (2225  UNTS
209) and in South African efforts to address trafficking at a sub-state level.
3.This approach has been enforced by the United States’ compliance 
mechanism, the Trafficking in Persons Report, which serves as a foreign 
policy tool.
4.States party to the Trafficking Protocol are obligated in terms of international 
law to domesticate anti-trafficking legislation.
5.Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of
2007 and the Children’s Act 38 of 2005. The anti-trafficking provisions of
the Children’s Act only came into force on 1 April 2010.
6.Although,  a  reading  of  the  Department  of  Social  Development’s  draft
regulations suggests  that implementation of the Act will  be devolved to
the provincial level (Government Gazette 2015).
7.However, this assertion is tempered by a recent initiative by the Department of
Social  Development  to  host  a  roundtable  with  various  stakeholders
highlighting the need to improve the coordination of victim support services
and  referral  system.  It  remains  to  be  seen  whether  this  is  applied  across
implementing  government  departments.  See,  http://www.southafrica.info/
services/rights/trafficking-240215.htm#.VWBxKkazkYc.
8.The programme was supposed to realise the following result area outputs: (i) a
deepened understanding of human trafficking in South Africa, (ii) developed a
multisectoral,  coordinated  prevention of and response to human trafficking,
(iii)  increased public awareness  and understanding of human trafficking in
South  Africa  and  the  Southern  African  Development  Community,  (iv)
contributed  to  better  criminal  investigation  and  prosecution  and  (v)
contributed to more effective assistance (Kotu-Rammopo 2010, 6).
9.   These responsibilities and duties include the development of a draft national
policy framework, the establishment of an integrated information system, the
development  and  review  of  guidelines  on  the  identification  of  victims  of
trafficking  and  traffickers,  the  establishment  of  public  awareness
programmes  and  the  making  of  recommendations  with  regard  to  the
amendment of the national policy framework’. (SCDSC 21 November 2012, 7)
10.Provision is made for the formalisation of a coordination mechanism by the 
Minister of JCDto ensure the implementation of the Act and coordination 
of government role-players.
11.Awareness-raising,  building  political  will  and  capacity,  providing  legal
alternatives  to  migration and reducing ‘push’ factor conditions. The latter
two strategies are yet to be fully realised in the South African context.
12. Demand-based  programs  are  based  on  the  assumption  that  informing
consumers about trafficking and its victims, imposing criminal sanctions
against consumers,  making the use of these services socially unacceptable,
or educating potential  traffickers or beneficiaries about  prostitution,  gender
violence, human rights, and other issues, will reduce demand. (Shinkle 2007,
9)
13.The Prevention of Organised Crime Act allows for the forfeiture of assets 
of convicted traffickers.
14.The 2014 US Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report noted that:
The government failed to identify as trafficking victims 75 Indonesian
seamen – unpaid  and abandoned by their captains in the Port of Cape
Town  in  late  September  2013  –  despite  their  reported  screening  by
Home Affairs officials. In addition, officials held the  75 fishermen in
immigration detention for more than two months. In February 2014,
the  South  African  government  paid  for  their  return  flights  home  and
permitted them to  bypass  immigration  when  departing  South  Africa;
thus,  the  victims’  passports  do  not  reflect  their  departure  as  a
deportation,  allowing  them  to  continue  working  as  seamen  in  the
future.
See also, the LexisNexis SA Human Trafficking Awareness Index Report.
15.In the form of skills dissemination aimed at reducing vulnerability.
16.Which intersects with protection programmes and aims to prevent re-
trafficking of victims.
17.A lack of transparency created by dealing with child victims under the 
Children’s Act means that little is known as to the quality of aftercare 
provided to children.
18.Particularly by the Department of Labour.
19. For example, law enforcement reported being unable to place suspected 
victims in shelters if the victims failed to provide evidence of force, fraud, or 
coercion immediately after their rescue. Suspected criminals could only be 
held for 48 hours without evidence, and many traumatized victims were 
unable or unwilling to provide statements within that time frame, leading to
the release of suspected offenders. (US TIP Report 2014)
20.Although a reading of the TIP Act and DSD regulations places the burden of 
rehabilitation and reintegration largely on accredited shelters (service 
providers).
21.Sex workers in South Africa complain of being raped, physically and verbally
assaulted  and  extorted  by  police  officers.  Many are  unable  to  open cases
(especially of rape) against perpetrators of crimes against them due to their
stigmatised profession.
22.Time and resources (i.e. financial costs) have been cited as reasons why 
members are not vetted (Part. Obs., Durban, January 2013).
23.In December 2006, 26 Thai women and four men were arrested following a raid
on a Durban  ‘gentlemen’s  club’  After  Dark.  This  led to  the  discovery of
more  women  being  kept  at  another  in  Pinetown.  Allegations  were  made
against the investigating officer by the Thai sex workers,  and several Home
Affairs officials were arrested for supplying fraudulent visas and passports.
24.See, The State v Basheer Sayed and Another, Umbilo Case: 471/10/2007 – ‘Thai 
2’, Case No: 41/ 213/2008.
25.For the judgment, see Basheer Sayed, Somcharee Chulchumphorn v Levitt NO,
The National Director of Public Prosecutions, Case No: AR101/2011, Case 
No: 5582/2010.
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